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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J . P . K O C H , INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

> Case No.
13850

J . C. P E N N E Y C O M P A N Y ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is a suit to recover money allegedly owing
for labor and material furnished for the improvement
of property owned by the appellant pursuant to a construction contract, said action being based upon the
provisions of Section 14-2-1 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)
et.seq.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT
The appellant's statement as to the disposition of
the lower court is essentially correct.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the Judgment entered by the lower court against the appellant, J . C.
Penney Company, sustained.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts
contained in the appellant's Brief in part. However, the
Statement of Facts should include additional information. I t is true that on or about September 18, 1970,
the bond required by the contract between the appellant
and Skyline Construction Company, the general contractor, was deleted from said general contract. This
deletion took place after the appellant requested of
Skyline Construction the amount of deduction that
would be made if the bond were deleted. I t was determined that a deduction of approximately $11,000.00 in
the cost of the project could be made if the bond were
deleted and as a result the appellant deleted the bond
requirement. (Peterson deposition pages 3 and 4, lines
7 through 7). The respondent was not notified of the
deletion of the bond requirement.
I t is true that during the period of construction,
progress payments were made by the appellant to the
general contractor from time to time as work progressed.
The payment requests submitted by Skyline to the appellant were accompanied usually by some type of lien
waiver from the various subcontractors and materials
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men on the job. The lien waivers with which the Court
is here concerned are designated as pages 95 through
104 inclusive, of the Record on Appeal. There is no
dollar figure nor date appearing on the first waiver. (R.
95). The same is true with the second waiver. (R. 96).
Page 97 of the Record reflects the first lien waiver
wherein a particular dollar figure is indicated. Again,
however, this waiver bears no date. I t does however,
speak in terms of labor and materials furnished on or
before April 30, 1971. The next lien waiver is dated
May 31, 1971. (R. 98). The figures contained in said
lien waiver do not in any way correspond or conform
with the figure indicated on the prior lien waiver. The
next lien waiver is also dated May 31, 1971. (R. 99).
I t reflects a different amount received as of May 31,
1971 than does the previous one. The next lien waiver
is dated June 30, 1971. (R. 100). The only blank filled
in on that lien waiver is a figure for the total amount
received to the date of June 30, 1974. The next lien
waiver is dated August 8, 1971. (R. 101). The figures
contained in such lien waiver are inconsistent with the
figures in the prior lien waivers. The discrepancy between these two waivers is the sum of $54,793.20. The
next lien waiver is dated August 27, 1971. (R. 102).
The figures contained in this lien waiver are inconsistent with all those prior thereto. This lien waiver in
fact reflects a decrease in the figure representing the
total amount received from the prior lien waiver. The
next lien waiver bears Peterson's stamp date of October 13, 1971. (R. 103). Otherwise it is undated. The
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figures contained in said lien waiver are inconsistent
with any of the lien waivers prior thereto. The final
lien waiver bears the date of October 31,1971. (R. 104).
Again, the figures contained therein are inconsistent
with the figures contained in all of the prior lien waivers.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT W A S CORRECT
I N I T S F I N D I N G T H A T U N D E R T H E CIRCUMSTANCES OF T H I S CASE T H E A P P E L L A N T I S L I A B L E TO T H E R E S P O N D E N T
B Y V I R T U E O F T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F SECT I O N 14-2^1 U.C.A. (1953 A S A M E N D E D ) ET.
SEQ.
The appellant asserts that it is indebted to the respondent in the sum of only $11,317.02. The appellant
bases this assertion upon the lien waiver dated October
31, 1971. (R. 104). The appellant asserts that it paid
the sum of $579,608.34 to Skyline Construction Company as payment for work performed by the respondent.
The prime contractor, Skyline Construction Company
failed to pay a total sum of $58,308.61 exclusive of interest to the respondent.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear
that the appellant is liable to the respondent in the sum
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of $56,147.97 as a matter of law. Section 14-2-1 U.C.A.
(1953 as amended) provides as follows:
"The owner of any interest in land entering into
a contract, involving $500.00 or more, for the
construction of any building structure or improvement upon land shall, before any such work
is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond
in the sum equal to the contract price with good
and sufficient sureties conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed
under the contract. Such bond shall run to the
owner and to all other persons as their interest
may appear; any person who furnished materials
or performed labor for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, payment for
which has not been made, shall have a direct right
of action against the sureties upon such bond for
the reasosable value of the materials furnished or
the labor performed, not exceeding, however, in
any case, the prices agreed upon; which right of
action shall accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or default in the performance of the work provided for in the contract."
Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., (1953) provides as follows:
"Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein
required, shall be personally liable to all persons
who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case, the prices agreed
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall
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be commenced within one year from the last date
the last materials were furnished or the labor per*
formed . . . " (emphasis added)
As is admitted by the appellant, and is clear from
the facts set forth, the appellant failed to require a bond
with a good and sufficient surety to guarantee the
prompt payment for the material furnished and the
labor performed under the contract with Skyline Construction Company. At the time that the respondent
submitted its bid to Skyline Construction Company on
the appellant's project, said appellant required that
such project be a bonded job. Thereafter, the appellant deleted the requirements for bonding on the part
of Skyline Construction Company without notice to
the respondent due to the savings in costs on the project
of approximately $11,000.00.
This Court has had occasion to construe the meaning of the above quoted statutory language and has
held that the owner of the property is liable to the subcontractors and employees of contractors for materials
and labor supplied for improvement upon such land
even where releases and lien waivers for the entire
amount due and owing such person had been signed and
delivered to the owner. In fact, however, such persons
had not received the entire amount due and owing under
the contract and employment agreements. This Court
has consistently held that such releases and waivers were
given without consideration and thus ineffective.
In the case of Pierce v. Pepper, 17 Utah 2d *SG^
6
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405 P.2d 345 (1965), plaintiff's employees were paid
by their employer, Pepper, with worthless checks. They
went to the defendant owner-builder who paid them for
part of their work on condition that they sign releases
and give lien waivers which would cover the entire
amount of work which they had performed. The plaintiffs proceeded to complete the job, but were still unpaid for their prior labor because of the worthless checks.
Recovery against the owner-builder was granted because
of his failure to require the contractor to post the statutory contractor's bond as required under Section 14-2-1,
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The court held:
"Failure to require the contractor to file the
statutory bond is absolute and not subject to
compromise here since the obligation was not
dubious, contradictory or otherwise and any attempt to circumvent the statutory interdiction
was without consideration . . . Having violated
it . . . there was no consideration for the waivers,
and the failure to require the contractor to file a
bond to protect these workers under the plain
wording of the statute, cannot ameliorate the obligations of the builder from its terms. . . . " (emphasis added)
This Court again had occasion to construe the
meaning of this statute in the case of Roberts Investment Company v. Gibbons and Reed Concrete Products
Company, 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d 116 (1969). In
that case the owner of the property, while proceeding
with the building project, employed various contractors
to accomplish different phases of the construction. In
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attempting to fulfill its contract with the owner, one of
the contractors obtained concrete from Gibbons and
Reed Concrete Products Company. Subsequently, the
owner took over the construction project from that contractor and proceeded to complete the building. The
owner thereafter acquired additional concrete from Gib*
bons and Reed Concrete Products Company. The owner subsequently paid Gibbons and Reed concrete Products Company for the amount of concrete which it had
ordered after taking over the construction project from
the contractor. Along with this payment, the owner demanded a receipt which recited that the sum mentioned
was in full payment for labor and material furnished
by Gibbons and Reed for the building in question, and
further recited that disputes over amounts due for materials delivered to the owner were waived and settled
and Gibbons and Reed released the owner from any and
all claims it may have against the owner. The trial court
concluded that the release and receipt was a release of
all claims of Gibbons and Reed and entered judgment
of no cause of action. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that (1) the owner's payment of that amount to
Gibbons and Reed was not sufficient consideration for
the supplier's release of their claim against the contractor, and, (2) under Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A.
(1953), the owner who had failed to obtain a performance bond from the contractor was liable for the amount
owing the suppliers for concrete supplied by them to
the Contractor. There was no dispute in the case that
the owner had failed to comply with the requirements of
8
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Section 14-2-1, U.C.A. (1953). However, the owner
contended that having made the payment and having
received the release of all claims from Gibbons and
Reed, it was relieved from any liability arising under the
statute. The Court, citing Pierce v. Pepper, supra, rejected defendant's argument and held that there was no
consideration for the release of the claim against the
contractor and by virtue of non-compliance with the
statute, the owner was personally liable for such claims.
The Court is confronted with the same type of situation
here. The respondent did not receive the money due
under the terms of the contract. The waivers given, in
addition to being inconsistent, were not supported by
any consideration whatsoever.
The appellant has gone to great lengths in its
Brief attempting to review the law regarding mechanics'
liens. The requirements with which the Court is here
concerned are set forth in Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The appellant would have
this Court ignore these statutes and merely review the
mechanics' liens statutes of the state. We are not here
concerned with the respondent's right to a mechanics'
lien on the appellant's property, although even under
such law, the respondent asserts that it would have had
a valid claim.
It is to be noted that the statute in question does
not make any qualification whatsoever as to the personal
]lability of one who fails to comply with the requirements of that statute. Quite the contrary, the statutory
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duty to file the bond is mandatory and any attempt to
circumvent the statutory interdiction is without consideration. Pierce v. Pepper, supra. The appellant has
attempted to engraft upon the statute limitations of
liability without any legal authority in support of its
position. The appellant cites various mechanics' lien
cases which are inapplicable when applied to the fact
situation with which the Court is here confronted. The
appellant cites Zions First National Bank v. Reginald
L Sawton, et al, 27 Utah 2d 76, 493 P.2d 602 (1972)
in support of its position. The factual situation in Saxton clearly demonstrates its inapplicability herein. In
Saxton. the appellant had in fact been paid in excess
of the amount of his claim. The fact that he signed a
lien waiver at the time that he received payment demonstrates that full and adequate consideration was given
is in exchange for receipt of the lien waiver. The actions
of the appellant in Sacvton subsequent to his receipt
of the funds were irrelevant to the consideration before the Court. I t should further be noted that the case
made no reference whatsoever to Section 14-2-1 and
14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953), and dealt solely with the mechanics' lien statutes.
The same distinctions as above set forth hold true
with regard to the case of Holbrook v. Websters, Inc.,
7 Utah 2d 1 4 8 , H # P . 2 d 661 (1958). The Court specifically found that the appellant had executed the receipt
and lien waivers in exchange for good and valuable consideration. I t is again important to note that Holbrook
did not concern itself whatsoever with Section 14-2-1
10
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and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953). Holbrook, as was the case
in Saxton, concerned itself strictly with the operation of
the mechanics' lien statutes.
The case of West v. Pinkston, 44 Utah 123, 138 P .
1152, in addition to being distinguishable on the same
basis as the above cases, was decided in 1914. The specific language of the Utah Supreme Court in West, as
quoted by the appellant in its Brief, clearly states that
the decision of the Court was based upon the statutes
concerning mechanics' liens as they existed at that time.
However, the appellant fails to point out that the "statute" to which the Court referred was not the statute
with which the Court is confronted in the case at bar,
and indeed such burden would be impossible due to the
fact that the statute now in question was not enacted by
the Utah Legislature until 1915.
The appellant further cites the two cases of King
Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah
2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962) and Crane Company v.
Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837.
In each of these cases, the Utah Supreme Court looked
at cases decided under the mechanics' lien statutes in
order to determine what was lienable. After considering whether a leasehold interest constituted an ownership interest which could be lienable in the former and
whether a boiler was purchased for resale or whether a
contract had been entered into for alteration and repair
of the defendants property in the latter, the Court, specifically held in Crane, that,
11
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"The owner may escape personal liability by obtaining the bond as required by the statute."
There are no qualifications of liability imposed by these
cases.
The appellant asserts in its Brief that liability
under Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953) is not
absolute. In support of this proposition the appellant
cites the case of Apex Lumber Company v. Comanche
Construction Company, 18 Utah 2d 119, 417 P.2d 131
(1966). In that case some Utah farmers employed
Comanche Construction Company to install turkey enclosures upon their land. In the process, Comanche obtained materials from Apex Lumber Company. Upon
completion of the job, Apex Lumber Company accepted
promissory notes from the contractor as payment for
the materials supplied. Comanche Construction subsequently resorted to bankruptcy, making the promise
sory notes worthless. Secondly, the evidence demonstrated that Apex allocated in a somewhat arbitrary
manner the amounts due from each specific farmer. The
jury found that Apex had been paid by virtue of its
acceptance of the promissory notes.
The language quoted by the appellant in its Brief
requires analysis. The Court stated that,
"Apex urges that (1) the evidence shows Apex
supplied material for which it was not wholly
paid. Apex is right, but this is not controlling,
since such an argument would insure it against
12
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any non-payment which it itself helped to produce, as was the case here. Further it says, (2)
that under the statute it has a cause of action for
the unpaid value of the material. Equally, this
is true, unless it was particeps in creating a defense for its opponents, as was the case here.
Each of these positions is consistent with the holding in the case and the finding by the jury that Apex
simply was estopped by virtue of the fact that it had
been paid for the materials supplied in the construction
of the turkey enclosures. Apex demanded and received
the promissory notes in full payment for the balance
due Comanche. Apex, of course, had the option to
require cash payment and the fact that it accepted payment through another medium was its own choice. I t
was thereby estopped by virtue of payment in fact.
Assuming arguendo, that Apex does represent a
qualification of the terms of liability imposed by Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953), one must note
the policy upon which that qualification rests. In footnote Number 1 at page 131, the Court states:
"This statute can stand a re-evaluation, since it
puts the onus of obtaining the contractor's bond
on the unsuspecting and unknowledgeable householder who seldom knows of its existence—in
favor of the prime supplier, who generally knows
all about it but relies on it in sober silence, (emphasis added)"
When one considers this statement by the Court in
light of the facts presented in the case at bar, it is irp13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mediately apparent that such policy is not involved in
this case. J . C. Penney Co. is a highly sophisticated
international corporation that has built hundreds of
stores across the United States. The appellant is not
in the position of the "unsuspecting and unknowledgeable householder" who seldom knows of the existence of
the statute. In fact, the appellant knew of the existence
of the statute and initially required that a bond be posted
by the contractor as security for payment of the materialmen and suppliers on this job. However, upon
learning that deletion of this requirement would save
the appellant approximately $11,000.00 in the cost of
the project, a change was instituted whereby this requirement was deleted. Thus, one need only turn to the
second Kings Brothers case, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d
17 (1968), wherein the Court specifically required that
if the owner fails to comply with Section 14-2-1 and
14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), "it places upon him the burden
of seeing that the labor and materials are paid for."
The facts in the case at bar demonstrate that the appellant did not carry its burden as required by the laws
of the State of Utah and that there was no consideration
given in exchange for the lien waivers supplied by the
respondent. The respondent was not paid. (See Pierce
V. Pepper, supra, and Roberts Investment Company v.
Gibbons and Reed Concrete Products, supra.)
The appellant in its Brief asserts that the laws
of the mechanics' lien statutes, as construed by the
various cases handed down by the Utah Supreme Court,
should govern the extent of applicability of Section 1414
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953). The respondent cannot accept this assertion as being the law of the State
of Utah. If the mechanics' lien statute is the law which
governs the situation with which the Court is now confronted, then why did the Legislature see fit to enact
Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953)? The Utah
Supreme Court has spoken to this point in the past.
In King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13
Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254, (1962), the Court said that
the mechanics' lien statute was designed to prevent the
land holder from taking the benefit of improvements
without paying for labor and materials incident thereto. However, the Court noted that the land owner frequently was the loser when the contractor failed to pay
for the material and labor supplied. The Court noted
that the passage of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A.
(1953) was a natural consequence of this inequity and
protected the laborer, the materialmen, and the land
owner.
The King Brothers case above cited is relied upon
by the appellant. However, appellant failed to illuminate the sequel to the above case which was King
Brothers Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d
43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968) wherein the Court dealt with
the question of whether the owner of a leasehold interest in land was "the owner of any interest in land" under
Section 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), The Court
utilized adjudications under the mechanics' liens statutes
only for the determination of the definition of an "owner" so as to apply the above referenced statute. Again,
15
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the Court was impelled to note that:
"the statutes quoted above (Section 14-2-1 and
14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953) which required the owner
to obtain a bond from a contractor, are a natural
development upon the mechanics' lien statutes,
which compel the owner of realty, who contracts
for its improvement, to see that those who furnish
the labor and materials are paid. The requirement of the performance bond provides a means
by which the owner can protect himself as well as
the labor and materialmen. But if he fails to
comply with the statute, it places upon him the
burden of seeing that the labor and materials
are paid for . . ." (emphasis added).
It is therefore clear that the statute in question is
not limited and totally governed by the mechanics' lien
statute and the a judications thereunder. This Court
has acknowledged the specific requirements of Sections
14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953) in placing an extra
burden upon a land owner so as to insure the payment
of all materialmen and suppliers for the improvement
made upon the owner's property. Thus, by failing to
observe the requirements of the laws of this State, the
appellant had the burden of seeing that the respondent
was in fact paid.
POINT II
T H E COURT B E L O W W A S CORRECT IN
H O L D I N G T H A T T H E A P P E L L A N T COULD
N O T J U S T I F I A B L Y R E L Y ON T H E L I E N
WAIVERS IN QUESTION.
16
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The District Court held that the appellant could
not justifiably rely on the lien waivers in question.
Contrary to the position taken in the appellant's Brief,
the Court below referred to such unjustified reliance in holding that "said reliance is not a defense to
the claim of the plaintiff." (R. 28). The fallacy of
the appellant's argument of justifiable reliance is demonstrated simply by reference to the facts of this case,
and specifically with reference to the admissions of the
appellant's agent, the supervising architect.
In the process of the construction of the appellant's
store in Bountiful, Skyline Construction Company periodically submitted requests for progress payments.
These requests were submitted on a monthly basis and
were accompanied by various lien waivers signed by the
subcontractor and materialmen working on the project
(Page 7 through 8, Peterson's deposition.) These items
were submitted to Charles Peterson, the supervising
architect employed by the appellant, who would, upon
receipt, inspect the job site to determine whether the
amount submitted on the draw request and supported by
lien waivers was correct in terms of progress on the project. According to Mr. Peterson,
"We would take these lien waivers and review
them and see that the amount shown on the lien
waivers were consistent with the amount of money
that had been paid on the previous estimate."
(Peterson's deposition pages 7 and 8 lines 25
through 2).
17
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On various occasions, Mr. Peterson would require
changes to be made before he would authorize payment.
H e would therefore, request lien waivers reflecting a
different amount than the one submitted. Mr. Peterson
accepted changed lien waivers which would sometimes
reflect only the difference between what was furnished
by the first one and the amount of change that he had
requested, and at the same time accepted a subsequent
lien waiver covering the full amount. (Peterson deposition, page 10 through 11, lines 13 through 17). With
this system of accounting, inconsistency had to result.
In fact, Mr. Peterson knew that there were inconsistencies with regard to the lien waivers on behalf of the
respondent. H e brought these inconsistencies to the
attention of the appellant. The appellant took no action.
More importantly, however, Mr. Peterson states that,
" I suspected the maximum lien waiver that I
had, whether it was the previous month or the
succeeding month, was equal to or exceeded perhaps the amount of work that was accomplished.
I frankly did not worry too much if the lien
waiver exceeded the amount of money that was
shown on Skyline's monthly breakdown."
Mr. Peterson was basically satisfied because he thought
that the owner was being protected. (Peterson deposition page 14 lines 4 through 24.) Mr. Peterson further
acknowledges that he did not expect to get exact figures
with regard to lien waivers and basically was concerned
only with some supportive evidence that the subcon^
tractors were getting paid as the job progressed. (Peter18
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son deposition page 23 lines 7 through 11). Further,
when asked if, in his position, it was his primary concern to see that lien wavers were executed for a sum
equal to or more than the amount needed, he responded.
"equal to or more, because I assumed that if it
is more than shown on the trade categories, mayhe the general contractor, you know, paid a guy
for work a little early." (Peterson deposition
page 23 lines 17 through 19). (emphasis added).
Clearly, Peterson, as the agent for the appellant,
was not complying with the requirements laid down by
the second Kings Brothers case, 440 P.2d 17, wherein
the Court states:
"but if he fails to comply with the statute, it
places upon him the burden of seeing that the
labor and materials are paid for."
Peterson further admits that he was not relying
upon the lien waivers to show that actual payment had
been made but only that the subcontractors had waived
their lien. (Peterson deposition page 25 lines 19 through
22). Peterson also did not take it upon himself to advise
the subcontractors that various reductions were being
made in the lien waivers after they were submitted and
had no knowledge as to whether Skyline Construction
had assumed such responsibility. ..(Peterson deposition
page 29 lines 13-17.) Finally, Mr. Peterson admits,
that on or about July 14, due to the discrepencies contained in some of the lien waivers, it suggested to him
that possibly Skyline was not paying to some of the sub-
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contractors as much as was being represented. (Peterson deposition page 31 lines 7 through 15). Regardless
of this suspicion and, indeed, regardless of the requirements of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953 as
amended), Peterson, as the agent for the appellant,
failed to satisfy the appellant's burden of seeing that
the subcontractors were paid. H e assumed that maybe they were being paid.
With the procedure utilized by Mr. Peterson on
behalf of the appellant in handling the project, and in
referring to the lien waivers themselves, it is clear that
there is no basis for appellant's claim of justifiable reliance even if one were to ignore the fact that many of
the lien waivers were not dated when signed by Mr.
Niederhauser. One can see the obvious discrepency between the respondent's lien waivers dated May 31, 1971,
and June 30, 1971. Two out of the three blanks indicating payment were not filled in on the latter and
there is no acknowledgment on the part of Mr. Niederhauser of payment on that day in any amount. The
previous acknowledgment of payment on May 31, 1971,
acknowledged the receipt of an exact figure on that
date. The discrepancies however, do not end on June
31, 1971. The lien waivers dated August 8, 1971, August 27, 1971, and the lien waiver received by Mr. Peterson on October 13, 1971, but which was undated as to
the signature, and the lien waiver dated October 31,
1971, contain discrepancies in the figures represented
thereon which are impossible of explanation. When reviewing all of the waivers, it is clear that inconsistency
20
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permeated the entire system of lien waivers utilized by
the appellant. The respondent respectfully submits that
there was no basis on the part of the appellant for any
reliance when the lien waivers themselves, on their face,
were inconsistent with each other. Peterson, however,
when he received the final lien waiver dated October 31,
1971, upon which appellant asserts reliance, did not even
bother to compare it with the previous waivers. (Peterson's deposition p. 44, lines 4-10). The defendant had
no factual basis upon which to assert its so-called "justifiable reliance" and the respondent submits that such
assertion is without any merit whatsoever. Where there
were uncertainties in the instruments, such as is clearly
apparent here, it was incumbent upon the appellant to
resolve these uncertainties before acting in reliance on
these uncertain representations. (See the second King
Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., supra.) The appellant's assertion now that respondent is estopped by
virtue of these uncertain documents and representations,
is without merit and is not a basis upon which the appellant could assert justifiable reliance. (See Petty v.
Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 404 P.2d 30, 17
Utah 2d 32 (1965)).
The appellant further asserts that its defense of
reliance is available to a surety if a bond had been required. No Utah law is cited in support of this proposition. But, assuming that a defense of justifiable reliance would be available to a surety, one need only return
to the facts as above set forth to determine that there is
no basis for such a defense here. The appellant was ad21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vised of the discrepancies in the lien waivers and chose
to ignore it. But the appellant asserts that it took all
possible precautions to assure itself that all subcontractors were being paid by the general contractor
through progress payments during the course of the
construction project. Clearly, the appellant's position
is untenable and totally unsupported.
POINT III
T H E O R D E R C O N D I T I O N A L L Y STAYING ENFORCEMENT OF T H E JUDGMENT
IS V A L I D .
The Order Conditionally Staying Enforcement of
Judgment herein was just that: the execution upon the
Judgment was stayed upon the Stipulation of appellant to satisfy a condition. That condition is clearly
spelled out in the Order (R. 11).
Under Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court has discretion whether to
stay execution upon a Judgment under certain circumstances. Clearly, the respondent was entitled to execute immediately upon entry of the Judgment. Rule
62(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellant moved the Court for an Order Staying Enforcement of the Judgment against it, counsel
was heard on the motion and the Court entered its Order
whereby the appellant was given a choice in the matter
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and elected to perform pursuant to the condition contained in said Order. The appellant cannot now be
heard to complain regarding the exercise of its choice
in the matter. Appellant clearly had the alternative to
pay the Judgment assessed and pursue its appeal, or
retain the money represented by the Judgment and
agree to pay the interest rate ordered by the Court below. I t chose the latter. The Order is clear regarding
this matter.

CONCLUSION
It is clear from the facts of this case that the appellant has attempted to circumvent the statutory interdiction of Section 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953 as
amended). This Court has consistently held that such
attempts are unjustified and the failure of the owner to
require the bond under the plain wording of the statute
cannot ameliorate the obligations of the owner from its
terms. As this Court said in Pierce v. Pepper, supra,
"This Court did not pass the statute, but we
think it clear enough to impose liability if the
builder (owner) forgets it or tries to save a bond
premium by violating it."
The law of this state imposes a burden upon the
owner to see that the subcontractors and materialmen
are paid. When the owner disregards the requirement
of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) that burden is absolute. It requires that the owner
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determine for himself that these people who have contributed their efforts and materials for the benefit of
the owner are in fact paid for same. Here, the appellant,
by the admissions of its agent and supervising architect,
did not satisfy this duty.
The Judgment below in favor of the repondent and
against the appellant should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD H. MOFFAT
J O H N L. Y O U N G
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
9th Floor Tribune Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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